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S E N A T E B I L L 3580
76th Congress

Statement by

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF ACCOUNTANTS

Before
Subcommittee, Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency

STATEMENT ON SENATE BILL 3 5 8 0 IN THE 76TH
CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGISTRATION
AND REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
Statement

by American

Institute

of

Accountants

This statement, which deals only with Section 32 (c) (1)
of Senate Bill 3580, has been prepared by a special committee
of the American Institute of Accountants. The chairman of
this special committee is the president of the Institute, and its
members include a vice president, two members of the executive committee, the chairman of the special committee on
coöperation with Securities and Exchange Commission, and
a member of the committee on auditing procedure.
The American Institute of Accountants is the national professional organization of certified public accountants in the
United States, with a membership of 5,316, including the great
majority of those who act as auditors for companies registered
with the S.E.C. The Institute's activities are similar to those
of other professional organizations, including the maintenance
and enforcement of rules of professional conduct, preparation
of professional examinations, publication of technical and professional material, maintenance of an accounting library and
a research department, etc. The Institute has coöperated in
various ways with many governmental and private bodies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
consulted the Institute in the development of accounting rules
and regulations under the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act. These matters are mentioned in order to
inform the committee who we are, and to indicate that we are
generally familiar with the type of problems with which
Senate Bill 3580 deals.
A good many sections of the bill relate to accounting and
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auditing. While we are, naturally, keenly interested in the
bill as a whole, we believe it proper to restrict our recommendations to one provision of the bill, directly affecting professional
certified public accountants as such, which we consider important enough to justify this appearance before your committee.
It Is Recommended that Section 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 )

of the

Bill Be Deleted
We earnestly recommend that Section 32 (c) (1) of Senate
Bill 3580 be deleted. This section provides that:
"The Commission is authorized, by rules and regulations
or order in the public interest or for the protection of investors—
(1) to prescribe the minimum scope of and procedures
to be followed in any audit of a registered investment
company;"
We object to this provision on the ground that it would
permit assumption by a governmental administrative agency
of a responsibility which should be assumed by professional
practitioners; i.e., determination of how extensive an investigation an independent auditor should make, and the manner in
which he should make it, before signing his name to his own
professional opinion regarding the financial position and the
results of operations of the company under audit.
It is submitted that
(1) Such a responsibility could not be successfully assumed
by a governmental administrative agency;
(2) An attempt to fix minimum standards would tend to
lower rather than to raise the standards of auditing practice;
(3) It would be a new departure in federal legislation to
provide for supervision by government agents of the details of
the work of professional practitioners;
(4) It would be an unwarranted and unnecessary invasion
of a field of professional practice.
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Scope of Audit Is a Matter of Sound Judgment, Differing in Each Case, and Cannot Satisfactorily Be
Prescribed by Regulations
It may clarify our suggestion to interpolate at this point a
brief statement of the status of the certified public accountant
and the nature of his work. There are, at present, more than
19,000 certified public accountants in the United States. The
certificate of certified public accountant is issued by state
administrative boards, created by law, to candidates who have
met prescribed educational and experience requirements and
have passed written examinations in auditing, commercial law,
accounting theory and practice and, in some cases, other subjects. Certificates may be revoked for malpractice or unprofessional conduct.
The certified public accountant in professional public
practice is an independent practitioner. He is not employed
on a salary basis by the concerns which he audits but is retained
by them as clients, on a fee basis. His position is different from
that of the bookkeeper, internal auditor or controller permanently employed by a corporation. The position of the independent certified public accountant is comparable with that of
the practising attorney, engineer, or physician performing
services in particular cases for clients or patients who do not
direct the professional man as to methods but look to him for
results.
The rapid development of the profession of the certified
public accountant is largely a result of the public demand for
a disinterested, independent review and check by competent
technicians of the accounting records and the accounting judgment of the management of corporate enterprises which make
use of the savings of the public. The certified public accountant recognizes a heavy responsibility to all interested parties,
including stockholders, potential investors, and creditors, who
may be influenced by his professional opinion regarding the
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financial position and the results of operations of the company
concerned, as expressed in his report or certificate as a result
of his audit.
An audit is not a simple mechanical process. It is a highly
technical and complex procedure of examining or testing
accounting records and the evidence which supports them.
Some book entries may be confirmed by inspection of cash,
securities or other physical assets. Underlying evidence which
may be called for to support other entries in the accounts may
consist of such varying items as written confirmations of
accounts with debtors or creditors, directors' minutes, contracts,
vouchers, invoices, canceled checks, etc.
It is the duty of the auditor to satisfy himself that the
accounts and the financial statements based on them fairly
present the situation. He must use his own judgment as to
the extent to which it is necessary to check individual records
of transactions, and the manner in which they shall be checked,
in order so to satisfy himself. Various factors—for example,
the efficiency of the internal accounting or internal auditing
of the company—may have a bearing on his judgment of the
extent and nature of the examination which he must make in
each individual case.
No two cases are exactly alike. Frequently the auditor
finds it necessary to go further in some respects than is usual,
and perhaps, in other respects, due to favorable factors, he may
decide that it is unnecessary to do as much work as might be
customary. He is responsible morally and legally for the
opinion expressed in his report or certificate. He must decide
for himself the amount and nature of the work he must do in
order to justify the expression of his opinion.
If auditing were a simple mechanical process, the profession of the certified public accountant would not have developed so rapidly in numbers and in prestige. It is the need for
skilled judgment, based on technical training and experience,
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which has brought into existence the thousands of certified
public accountants who are practising in this country today.
The minimum scope of and procedures to be followed in
an audit cannot satisfactorily be laid down by rules and regulations as is provided in Section 32 (c) (1) of the bill. The
auditor must use his judgment and discretion in determining
the scope of the audit and the methods of procedure just as
much as in formulating his final opinion on the balance-sheet
and income statement which are the subject of his report.
The Government Should Not Assume the Responsibility Inherent in Section 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 )
No government agency nor any other body could set up
practicable rules or regulations prescribing the scope (extent)
of audit and the procedure (how to do it) to be followed by
auditors in all cases. If that were possible auditing would be
a routine procedure which could be left to clerks. No one can
foresee the circumstances which the auditor will encounter in
an individual case. The American Institute of Accountants has
had considerable experience with this problem. It published
in 1917, at the request of the Federal Trade Commission, an
outline of points to be covered in typical examinations, under
the title, "Approved Methods for the Preparation of BalanceSheet Statements," which was later approved by the Federal
Reserve Board. This outline was revised in 1929, under the
title "Verification of Financial Statements" and again in 1936,
under the title "Examination of Financial Statements by Independent Public Accountants." The several revisions indicate
growth and progress, as well as the impossibility of rigid
standardization. It has been necessary in each bulletin to
make clear that in individual cases an auditor may be justified
in departing and may find it necessary to depart from these
outlines, and may frequently find it necessary to go further
than the outline suggests.
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It has been frequently announced that the policy of the
Congress in enacting the Securities Act was only to provide
for full disclosure of material facts in the affairs of a company
offering its securities for sale, in order that the prospective
investor might have a fair basis for a decision as to whether
or not to purchase the securities. The Securities and Exchange
Commission requires that every prospectus issued under the
1933 Act bear the words, "These Securities have not been
approved or disapproved by the Securities and Exchange Commission" and "It is a criminal offense to represent that the
Commission has approved these securities or has made any
finding that the statements in this prospectus or in the registration statement are correct." In other words, the Government
says it takes no responsibility for the results of the investor's
decision. It seems to us that there is an analogy between this
problem and the problem raised by Section 32 (c) (1) of the
Senate Bill 3580.
If a government agency prescribed "the minimum scope
of and procedures to be followed in any audit of" an investment company it could hardly escape responsibility for the
results of an audit conducted in compliance with that prescription. It is possible that a competent auditor might comply
exactly with rules of the Commission regarding minimum
scope of audit and procedures to be followed, and yet fail to
discover material facts of the utmost importance to investors.
In such an event would the auditor be relieved of blame
because he had meticulously followed the instructions of a
government agency? Probably not, but the government
agency could hardly escape a share of the blame in the minds
of the investors whose interests had been adversely affected.
It is an ancient principle of law that a person whose conduct may be controlled and directed as to details of procedure
is an employee, or servant, as distinguished from an independent contractor who may choose his own methods and who is
held only for results. It is equally well established that there
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is a definite liability for acts of an employee performed in the
course of his employment. If the Commission were to prescribe
the procedures to be followed by accountants in their audits,
the independence of their relationship would be seriously impaired, and if they were to be treated like employees or servants
the Commission could not escape a share of moral responsibility
for any harm that might result from their acts.
It seems to us not in the interests of the Government itself
to assume a share of a responsibility which is rightfully a
private responsibility, resting on the shoulders of a professional
practitioner.
The Danger of Lowered Auditing Standards
Prescription of a minimum scope of audit would not, on
the face of it, prevent an auditor from undertaking additional
steps beyond the required minimum; but experience shows
that there is a tendency for minimum requirements to become,
in fact, maximum requirements. It would be difficult for an
auditor to persuade a client to agree to an examination more
extensive than that required by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. We believe that such a condition might result
in a lowering of the standards of auditing practice and might
dull the sense of personal responsibility which is now keenly
felt by the independent certified public accountant.
Section 3 2 ( c ) ( 1 ) Is a New Departure in Federal
Legislation
We know of no federal law providing for specification by a
government body of the procedures that professional practitioners shall follow, the manner in which they shall follow them,
the steps that they shall take in the performance of their professional work. Section 32 (c) (1) of Senate Bill 3580, which
does provide for such dictation to professional certified public
accountants, would be an innovation in federal legislation.
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It would be manifestly absurd to engage an attorney to
present a case, and then prescribe exactly what statutes and
decisions he should study, what arguments he should include
in his brief, and how he should present them in court. He
must use his judgment, with due regard for his professional
standing and integrity. It would be equally absurd to instruct
an engineer just how to apply the techniques of his profession
in the planning and supervision of the construction of a bridge,
or to instruct a physician in treating a patient. It is no less
futile to attempt to lay down a pattern in advance which all
certified public accountants must follow in conducting independent audits.
It is a commonplace that responsibility should carry commensurate authority. Certified public accountants bear heavy
responsibilities. They risk their professional reputations every
time they sign a report. They are subject to civil liabilities
under the common law and under the Securities Acts. They
are entitled to determine for themselves, without outside interference, what steps they will take in forming the opinions in
the expression of which they incur these risks.
The independent status of the professional certified public
accountant is vitally important in the performance of his
function. A principal reason for his engagement to conduct
an audit is to secure an objective, disinterested review of the
facts and the presentation of the company's affairs, which will
fully disclose information of importance to all parties at
interest. The independent auditor is "in the middle." He is
a kind of umpire. It is his duty to reveal the truth as he sees
it, not to present a report favorable to the wishes of management, of creditors, of a governmental regulatory agency, or
of any other one group. If a governmental agency had power
to prescribe the scope of his investigations and the procedures
which he should follow, it would acquire control and influence
over the accountant which might impair his objectivity. The
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accountant might, to a degree at least, assume the status of
an agent for the regulatory body.
A. A. Berle, Jr., now Assistant Secretary of State, in an
address before an accounting society, ascribed great importance
to this point. He said ". . . your profession . . . having freed itself from the chains of servitude to businessmen . . . may all too easily find itself merely the ciphering agency for virtually unreviewable bureaucrats. It took time
to teach merchants that they could not give orders to accountants as to what their figures should show; and the profession
must never drop to the point where its members are in demand
primarily because their opinions will change whenever a subexaminer, for reasons not put on the record, wishes a different
arrangement of figures."
Section 32 (c) (1) Would Be an Unwarranted and
Unnecessary Invasion of a Field of Professional
Practice
Certified public accountants have achieved recognition as
a profession in statutes, in the courts, and in the public mind.
They have built strong state and national professional organizations; they have developed technical standards of practice,
have maintained and enforced rules of professional conduct,
and have exercised disciplinary authority over their members.
This development has been gradual over the years and is continuing. They welcome the opportunity to cooperate with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and other private and
governmental agencies in further improvement of accounting
and auditing and corporate financial reporting.
It is offensive to the members of this profession to suggest
that the work of developing its technical and professional
standards should be taken from the hands of the profession
itself and be assumed by a department of the Federal
Government.
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The effect of Section 32 (c) (1), if it were administered
under the widest possible interpretation, would be to make
the Securities and Exchange Commission practically a partner
of the accountant in every audit engagement undertaken pursuant to the terms of Senate Bill 3580—a situation inconsistent
with the basic concept of the practice of any profession.
If the sponsors of the bill should argue that there is no
intention of applying the provisions of Section 32 (c) (1) in
any such extreme manner; that the Securities and Exchange
Commission would administer it in a reasonable way with
due respect for the considerations we have advanced, the reply
must be that it is no defense of bad law to say that it will be
well administered. We feel justified, therefore, in asking for
the elimination of this objectionable provision from the bill
itself.
Any effort to prescribe by rules and regulations the minimum scope of audit and procedure to be followed in all cases
is foredoomed to failure, since every case is different from
every other one. Mandate can never successfully be substituted
for professional judgment.
Respectfully submitted for
THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS
JOHN K. MATHIESON, chairman
SAMUEL J. BROAD
T. COLEMAN ANDREWS
VICTOR H. STEMPF
HOMER N. SWEET
C. OLIVER WELLINGTON

Special Committee
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